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Abstract 
We examine the evidence available on the efficacy of demand-side programs intended to 
stimulate broadband adoption. We review studies that attempt to measure results. Our suggestions 
for future program evaluations are to include cost-benefit analysis as a standard part of program 
review and to make clear that the purpose of evaluation is to assess progress made toward the 
ultimate policy goals rather than the program’s proximate implementation goals. Appropriate data 
must be collected to draw conclusions, and appropriate statistical methods must be used to 
determine the causal impacts of a program. This has rarely been done to date. 
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1 Introduction 
In February 2009, as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the 
“stimulus” bill), Congress directed the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) to develop a plan that “seek[s] to ensure that all people of the United States 
have access to broadband capability.”  The National Broadband Plan (FCC, 
2010), released in March 2010, makes it clear that to make further inroads into the 
segments of the population that have not adopted broadband, attention must be 
paid to both the supply and demand sides of the market.  While policy attention at 
the federal and state levels toward broadband has previously been directed mainly 
at the supply side in the US, a growing consensus argues that the demand side 
cannot be ignored.1  While definitive broadband mapping is still being planned 
and carried out in the US, data that we currently have suggests that broadband is 
available to the large majority of households.2  There may yet be much work to 
do to push the broadband network into the remaining unserved areas of the coun-
try, and there is clearly a role for policy if extending availability to areas currently 
deemed unprofitable by the market is the goal.   
However, attention should not remain exclusively on the supply side.  Gil-
lett, et al. (2006, p.11) state that,  
Once broadband is available to most of the country, differences in 
economic outcomes are likely to depend more on how broadband 
is used than on its basic availability.  The implication for economic 
development professionals is that a portfolio of broadband-related 
policy interventions that is reasonably balanced (i.e., also pays at-
tention to demand-side issues such as training) is more likely to 
lead to positive economic outcomes than a single-minded focus on 
availability. 
                                                 
1 During the ongoing FCC proceedings for the development of the National Broadband Plan, 
Intel Corp. (2009) noted that “more than one hundred parties commented on the importance of 
adoption and demand-side programs in the National Broadband Plan.”   
2 A recent survey from the Pew Internet & American Life Project indicates that only 4 percent 
of adults in the US report that they do not subscribe to broadband because of lack of availability 
(Horrigan, 2009b, p.42).  An even later survey commissioned by the FCC found that this figure 
has dropped below 2 percent (i.e., only 5 percent of the 35 percent of Americans who do not use 
broadband at home gave availability as their main reason for non-use). 
   
Since that statement was made, infrastructure deployment has continued to in-
crease, and opportunity for access now rapidly approaches ubiquity in the US.  
Consequently, the most cost-effective options to achieve the goals of the National 
Broadband Plan for continued gains in the level of adoption come from the de-
mand side.  As the cost of connecting the last few pockets lacking broadband in-
frastructure in the US begins to rise steeply, stimulation of demand looks ever 
more efficient.    
The US Congress has determined that stimulating demand for broadband 
is necessary, by requiring the FCC to create in the National Broadband Plan “a 
detailed strategy for achieving … maximum utilization of broadband infrastruc-
ture and service by the public….”3  The first task for the policy community 
should then be to determine the most effective means to increase demand for 
broadband service, so that effective methods can be replicated and expanded.  
Given the stakes, the standards of evidence for the success of a policy should be 
set high.  This leads to our major theme:  the body of evidence regarding evalua-
tion of demand-side efforts to encourage broadband adoption is exceedingly thin.  
A massive review of hundreds of digital literacy programs throughout the OECD 
countries puts it succinctly:  “…it is striking how little evidence initiatives have 
gathered on the impact of the activities on the participants” (Hilding-Hamann, et 
al. 2009b, p.54).  More specifically, Strover (2009, p.213) recently noted that 
“there is a lack of strong empirical data that would provide compelling evidence 
that economic and community development goals could be realized through pro-
grams that promote computer and Internet access.”  We agree, and observe that 
evidence adhering to high econometric standards for causality is especially scant.  
In particular, researchers must be especially careful to recognize that coincidence 
of a factor and an outcome does not imply causality.  This is sometimes called the 
Fallacy of False Cause—concluding that the simultaneous presence of two factors 
means that one caused the other, or, in a statistical sense, that correlation implies 
causality.4
Our two main points, then, are that demand-side policies must take their 
place alongside supply-side policies if greatly expanded adoption of broadband is 
the policy goal; and that reliable evidence establishing the effectiveness of exist-
ing demand-side policies has been insufficient.  The purpose of this paper is to 
examine carefully the evidence available on the effectiveness of demand-stimulus 
                                                 
3 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, sec. 6001(k)(2)(B). 
4 It is important to note that when we refer to the Fallacy of False Cause herein, we are not 
judging that the presumed causality is not present; rather, that evidence adequate to make such a 
conclusion has not been presented. 
 
   
programs for broadband adoption.  While we do not attempt to cover every initia-
tive ever tried for demand stimulus—an impractical task at this point, given that 
some reviews have found nearly 500 demand initiatives5—we have attempted to 
gather all formal evaluations of such programs.6   
The rest of the paper is organized into three main sections.  In section 2, 
we discuss the general types of initiatives and programs designed to stimulate 
broadband demand.  We organize our discussion of these programs around the 
barriers to broadband adoption that they tackle.  In section 3, we turn attention to 
evaluations of quantifiable results of such programs.  After reviewing the evi-
dence, we turn in section 4 to a discussion of our overall findings on the types of 
programs that are most effective.  We also give suggestions for best practice (or, 
at least, better practice) for future program evaluation to be performed as an im-
portant part of the National Broadband Plan.  Section 5 concludes. 
2 Types of Demand-Stimulus Programs 
There are many different kinds of programs designed to encourage broadband 
Internet access and adoption.  We organize the discussion of the various types of 
demand stimulus programs by categorizing them according to which of four main 
barriers to adoption they address:  the price of broadband service, lack of com-
puter ownership, lack of digital literacy, and a lack of perceived value of broad-
band (Horrigan, 2009a, 2009b, 2010). 7    
2.1 Programs to Mitigate Price As a Barrier to Broadband 
Service 
About 10 years ago, it appeared that the cost of subscribing to broadband service 
was the biggest hindrance to adoption.  A 2002 survey of dial-up consumers 
found that 72 percent of respondents stated that broadband was too expensive as 
their reason for not upgrading.8  However, the importance of high price as a bar-
                                                 
5 See Hilding-Hamann et al. (2009a,b), who identified 464 digital literacy initiatives (most 
with at least some involvement with broadband) worldwide in their research. 
6 Due to space limitations, we do not review every formal evaluation we found in this version 
of the paper.  See the working paper (Hauge and Prieger, 2009) for an expanded discussion of the 
issues involved and additional citations to program evaluations. 
7 See Horrigan (2009a,b,2010), and a similar survey conducted by Connected Nation (2008).  
The other top reason for non-adoption is lack of availability (cited by four percent of all respon-
dents, and 17 percent of non-broadband users in Horrigan (2009b)).  
8 The survey statistic is from a Yankee Group survey cited in OTP (2002). 
 
   
rier to access has declined in recent years.  Recent figures from Pew Internet and 
the FCC show that only about one-third of dial-up users (Horrigan, 2009b) or 
non-Broadband users in general (Horrigan, 2010) cite that prices would have to 
fall before they would switch to broadband.  Only 10 percent of non-Internet users 
give “too expensive” as their single reason for not using the Internet (Horrigan, 
2009b), although when allowed to select multiple reasons for non-use, about half 
mention cost (Horrigan, 2010).   Even today, prices clearly matter more for par-
ticular groups, such as households with low income.9  There are direct and indi-
rect approaches available for a program trying to break down the cost barrier that 
may be preventing a household from adopting broadband.  We discuss both be-
low.   
Direct subsidies aimed at the end-user of broadband (as opposed to the 
firm deploying the infrastructure) appear to be rare in the US; we are not aware of 
any states that offer general subsidies for broadband Internet service, and there are 
currently no such subsidies at the federal level either.  However, there are many 
subsidies and tax credits in the US targeting groups other than the general residen-
tial consumer.  For example, the E-Rate program for schools and libraries insti-
tuted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (TA96) is a prime example of a 
large, targeted subsidy.  The E-Rate program is discussed in section 3. 
Indirect methods to reduce service prices include policies such as those 
aimed at demand aggregation.  Demand aggregation refers to the practice of form-
ing a pool of potential broadband consumers into a single negotiating unit to face 
the supply side of the market.  While demand aggregation may be used mainly to 
procure supply for an otherwise un-served area, it also may have elements of in-
terest for demand-side policy (Gillett, Lehr, & Osorio, 2004).  Some demand ag-
gregation programs include provisions that mandate rate averaging among cus-
tomer locations.  Thus, demanders who are cheaper to serve (i.e., those in denser 
areas closer to the middle mile facilities of the provider) implicitly subsidize con-
sumers who are more expensive to connect to the network.  Generally, demand 
aggregation programs appear to be little studied. 
                                                 
9 Although many econometric studies of broadband demand control for income, Prieger and 
Hu (2008) provide one of the few estimates of the income elasticity of demand:  0.62 (for DSL): 
i.e., demand decreases as household income falls. 
 
   
2.2 Programs to Mitigate Lack of Computer Ownership As 
a Barrier to Broadband Service  
Without a computer in the household, broadband adoption at home is either pre-
cluded or restricted to more specialized forms of access such as through wireless 
handsets.  However, lack of computer ownership may not be as significant a bar-
rier as some believe.  Indeed, recent figures show that only five of the 21 percent 
of Americans that do not use the Internet say the lack of a computer is what pre-
vents them from using the Internet (Horrigan, 2009b).10  When allowed to choose 
more than one reason for non-use, however, 40 percent of non-users of the Inter-
net pick the response “I cannot afford a computer” (Horrigan, 2010).  
Still, many broadband programs and policies target computer ownership as 
the necessary first step toward Internet connection from home.  For example, 
evaluation of the Wireless Philadelphia (now the Digital Impact Group) Digital 
Inclusion Project showed that “free computer distribution is a critical element of 
the [project] and central to any early success” (OMG, 2008, p. i).  Lee (2009) 
similarly found that the computer provision component of ZeroDivide’s digital 
inclusion programs in California were crucial in gaining the participation of com-
munity members, and that providing broadband access alone would not have pro-
vided sufficient incentive for participation. 
2.3 Programs to Mitigate Lack of Digital Literacy As a Bar-
rier to Broadband Service 
Digital literacy is the “ability to use digital technology, communication tools or 
networks to locate, evaluate, use and create information.”11  About 11 percent of 
non-Internet users cite a barrier related to digital illiteracy as the main reason for 
not connecting, such as difficulty of use, a feeling that they are “too old to learn,” 
or that they “just don’t know how” to use the Internet  (Horrigan, 2009b).12  
These respondents constitute only about two percent of US households overall.  
                                                 
10 The situation differs in some countries with lower rates of computer ownership. About one 
third of survey respondents in Portugal without home Internet access reported they did not have 
home Internet access because they did not have a computer.  
11 See “Digital Literacy Definition and Resources”, web page on the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign University Library web site, http://www.library.illinois.edu/diglit/defini-
tion.html.  
12 However, the importance of digital literacy appears to be higher in Horrigan (2010), which 
uses different survey methodology:  46 percent of non-Internet users chose “I am not comfortable 
using a computer” as a reason (possibly among multiple choices) for non-use. 
 
   
However, digital illiteracy is a larger problem in certain groups.  Unsurprisingly, 
digital literacy is much less prevalent among the elderly and those with less edu-
cation and income than it is overall.  The median age of non-Internet users citing 
“usability” as a barrier to adoption is 70.13  Because of the unevenness of digital 
literacy, most (but not all) programs attempting to further digital literacy target 
specific groups:  the urban or rural poor, the elderly, the undereducated, the un-
employed, ethnic and linguistic minorities, the homeless, women, disabled, or at-
risk youth (Hilding-Hamann, Nielsen, and Pedersen, 2009a).   
Building digital literacy involves specific education and training in the use 
of computers and the Internet.  Such education may be promulgated through 
Community Technology Centers (CTCs).14  One of the largest CTC programs is 
Community Connects, run by the nonprofit group Net Literacy, which has set up 
more than 200 CTCs.15  Another large program, ConnectKentucky’s No Child 
Left Offline program, supports after-school digital literacy centers for schoolchil-
dren (ConnectKentucky, 2008)  
2.4 Programs to Mitigate Perceived Lack of Value As a 
Barrier to Broadband Service 
Some 22 percent of offline households say that they do not use the Internet be-
cause they are “not interested in getting online” (Horrigan, 2009b).  Similarly, 
lack of perceived value is also the barrier for the six percent whose main reason 
for staying offline is that they “don’t need it/don’t want it”, the four percent who 
are “too busy/[have] no time”, and the four percent who think it is a “waste of 
time”.  In a more recent survey, 14 percent of non-Internet users responded either 
that the Internet is a waste of time or that there is nothing they want to use or see 
on the Internet as their main reason for remaining offline (Horrigan, 2010).  
Policy aimed at increasing the perceived value of broadband for non-
adopters can proceed from one of two premises.  The first premise is that the con-
sumer is sovereign and has the information needed to make an informed decision 
whether to subscribe to broadband.  Policy based on the premise of consumer so-
vereignty presumes that since the consumer has revealed his preferences through 
his market action of not adopting broadband, the value of adopting must be made 
                                                 
13 All statistics are from Horrigan (2009b). 
14 A CTC is a local program, centered on a physical space, promoting education in the use of 
technology, typically in economically distressed urban and rural communities. 
15 See www.netliteracy.org/community_connects.asp.  
 
   
greater to tip the balance.  Policies that attempt to increase the amount or utility of 
content on the Internet fall into this category.   
A second premise is that the consumer either does not have enough infor-
mation to realize what the benefits of broadband are, or (more paternalistically) 
that the policymaker knows better than the consumer does and must convince him 
to change his mind.  Policy stemming from this premise seeks to “educate” the 
consumer, where the education is meant to be informative, persuasive, or both.      
Programs targeting specific segments of the market with information of 
particular use continue to have a place.  For example, given the relatively quick 
turnover of small and rural businesses, many owners may be unfamiliar with 
business use of the Internet and e-business.  So, even as residential use of the In-
ternet approaches ubiquity,16 there may be a continuing role for education of 
smaller businesses to teach owners how to employ broadband to lower their costs, 
improve productivity, and expand their markets.17   
Other “demand-pull” strategies (King, et al., 1994) proposed include de-
velopment of e-government (Turk, Blažič, and Trkman, 2008), disseminating and 
building knowledge about the new technology among intended adoptees, setting 
standards, and allowing broadband providers to manage their networks effi-
ciently.18  The list of potential policy issues that could conceivably affect the de-
mand for broadband and Internet usage is endless.  However, with the multifari-
ous nature of the Internet, it is probably wishful to expect much impact from any 
single policy intending to affect broadband demand indirectly by changing what is 
available online. 
3 Review of Broadband Demand Studies 
In this section and the next, we turn to a review and critique of the literature on 
the success of specific demand-side broadband policies and programs.  Such an 
evaluation is especially important in light of Congress’ charge to the FCC to ana-
lyze “the most effective and efficient mechanisms for ensuring broadband access 
                                                 
16 Per Horrigan (2010), only 22 percent of adults in the US do not use the Internet or broad-
band at home. 
17 See Prieger and Heil (forthcoming) for a review of how e-business affects the productivity 
of firms and other aspects of their business. 
18 Savage and Waldman (2004, 2009) show that it is the promise of greater speed that makes 
most consumers willing to pay for broadband over dial-up Internet access.  
 
   
by all people of the United States” in the National Broadband Plan.19  We begin 
with a review of broadband demand studies in this section.  While many demand 
factors considered in such studies (e.g., race) are not subject to manipulation by 
policy, other determinants of demand are (e.g., price).  We focus only on the vari-
ables considered in such studies that can be controlled by policy.  In section 4, we 
consider the literature evaluating specific programs and initiatives aimed at foster-
ing broadband adoption.   
Econometric studies of broadband adoption have identified a variety of 
socio-economic, demographic, and policy variables that are associated with the 
demand for broadband, both at the individual and aggregate levels.  Ford, Kout-
sky, and Spiwak (2008) state that demographic and economic endowments ex-
plain 91 percent of the variation in broadband subscription across OECD coun-
tries.20  However, many of the results found in studies on broadband demand are 
of little direct relevance for stimulating demand because policymakers cannot 
manipulate the demand drivers found (such as race).   
On the other hand, policy may stimulate demand for broadband through 
the price mechanism, and a good understanding of how sensitive adoption is to 
the price of service is important.  In the first of several demand studies using simi-
lar methods, Rappoport, et al. (2001) found that demand for broadband via cable 
modem in the US was price inelastic, but that demand for DSL was price elas-
tic.21 The study also found, unsurprisingly, that DSL and cable modems were sub-
stitutes, and so attributed the differences in own-price elasticities to differences in 
penetration.22 Crandall, Sidak, and Singer (2002) updated the previous study and 
found that the elasticities had not changed substantially.  But in their own follow-
                                                 
19 Households’ preferences over communication methods have changed greatly over the past 
30 years.  Analyses of programs designed to encourage adoption of landline telecommunications 
services are useful as precursors to those current studies that consider programs to encourage 
adoption of broadband.  For detailed information and additional references, see Hauge, Chiang, 
and Jamison (2009). 
20 Ford, Koutsky, and Spiwak (2008) study fixed broadband adoption, analyzing the per capita 
broadband subscription rate for each OECD country.  They include demographic explanatory vari-
ables such as income, age, education, household size, and others.   
21 The elasticity of demand measures the percentage increase in quantity demanded when the 
price falls by one percent, holding other factors constant.  Demand is said to be elastic when the 
elasticity of demand is greater than 1.0 in magnitude and inelastic when it is less than 1.0 in mag-
nitude.  Inelastic demand would imply that broadband is not very sensitive to price changes. 
22 That is, since cable was more widely deployed than DSL in the first years of broadband in 
the US, cable modem service often faced no substitutes.  DSL service, on the other hand, often 
faced an intermodal substitute (cable modem service).  The presence of substitutes makes demand 
for a service more elastic. 
 
   
up study, Rappoport, Kridel, and Taylor (2002) found that demand for the ser-
vices was becoming more inelastic, perhaps indicating that prices were drop-
ping,23 penetration was increasing, or that consumers increasingly viewed the ser-
vices as essential.24 Dutz, Orszag, and Willig (2009) find that broadband demand 
elasticity continued to drop during 2005-2008, and therefore that the importance 
of broadband to household consumers (as measured by net consumer surplus) in-
creased.    
Broadband demand studies have also been performed on non-US markets.  
Ida and Kuroda (2006) found that the demand for ADSL in Japan was price ine-
lastic and that the demand for cable modem and fiber to the home was price elas-
tic, perhaps because of the dominance of ADSL in Japan, consistent with the 
analyses of Rappoport, et al. (2001) and Rappoport, Kridel, and Taylor (2002).  
Cardona, et al. (2007) show that for Europe, the price elasticity of demand for 
broadband varies with the amount of competition in the market, as is expected 
with most goods.   
Competition is another factor analyzed in many studies, and is another va-
riable that affects broadband prices.  In fact, some aggregate studies on broadband 
penetration include the state of competition in broadband provision instead of 
prices.25  Aron and Burnstein (2003) look at the effect of competition (along with 
other factors) on the broadband penetration rate, which commingles supply 
(availability) and demand.  The authors find that intermodal competition drives 
increased broadband penetration, reporting that an overlap of cable and DSL 
availability results in an approximately 6.5 percent increase in adoption per cap-
ita.  Lee and Brown (2008) use data from the top five OECD broadband penetra-
                                                 
23 For many forms of demand, including linear demand curves, demand becomes more inelas-
tic as price falls. 
24 At about this same time, Varian (2002) examined consumers’ willingness to pay for addi-
tional bandwidth for an Internet access service and found that demand was price inelastic, consis-
tent with Rappoport, Kridel, and Taylor (2002).  Another study worth mentioning, due to the fre-
quency with which its conclusions are cited in regulatory filings, is the demand estimation of 
Goolsbee (2006).  He finds that demand for broadband was highly elastic in 1998-1999, as esti-
mated from a stated preference survey. He measured the price elasticity of demand for broadband 
to be -2.75 on average in his sample. 
25 While in some cases the decision not to include prices in regressions of broadband penetra-
tion is prompted by lack of price data, there are also sound theoretical reasons for the omission.  
Broadband penetration in an area is determined by the interaction of availability, supply decisions, 
and demand for service.  As such, service prices are likely endogenous (that is, correlated with the 
error, which renders least squares regression inconsistent) in the econometric model for the pene-
tration level.  Thus, merely regressing penetration on price cannot identify the price elasticity of 
demand.  See Distaso, Lupi, and Manenti (2006) for an approach that uses a model of competition 
in supply to solve explicitly for a reduced form estimating equation without prices. 
 
   
tion countries and obtain results similar to Aron and Burnstein (2003).  They 
show that platform competition (along with speed and use of ICT) contributes to 
adoption, and that these effects are stronger the more similar the market shares are 
across technologies.  Distaso, Lupi, and Manenti (2006) perform a similar analy-
sis using a model of oligopoly competition and data from 14 European countries.  
They find slightly different results:  inter-platform competition drives adoption, 
but competition in the market for DSL between incumbents and entrants using the 
incumbent’s network does not play a significant role.  They also highlight the im-
portance of the prices of substitute goods by stating that increasing the price of 
local calls (and therefore narrowband Internet access) should encourage consum-
ers to switch to broadband Internet.  However, with only seven percent of Ameri-
cans remaining as dial-up Internet users at home (Horrigan, 2009b), the policy 
relevance of this finding may be small.      
Given the importance of the barriers to adoption of the lack of a computer, 
digital illiteracy, and lack of perceived value, it would be of great interest to in-
clude such factors in demand studies.  However, such studies are rare.  In one 
study that investigates such barriers, Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Muñoz (2006) 
show with data from 30 OECD countries over the years 2000 to 2002 that the pre-
disposition to use new technologies (an aspect of digital literacy) appears to be the 
key driver for demand.  More recently, Rosston, Savage, and Waldman (2010) 
analyze consumer valuation of Internet service to show that such value increases 
with experience.  They conclude that a correctly targeted programs “that educate 
households about the benefits from broadband (e.g., digital literacy training), ex-
pose households to the broadband experience (e.g., public access) or directly sup-
port  the initial take-up of broadband (e.g., discounted service and/or hookup fees) 
have potential to increase overall penetration in the United States.”  
4 Evaluations of Programs Intended to Increase 
Broadband Adoption 
We now critique evaluations of programs designed to spur broadband adoption.  
We begin with initiatives created for that purpose, and then address policies that 
have goals other than increasing broadband usage but that nevertheless can have 
substantial impacts on adoption.  Among programs specifically intended to spur 
broadband adoption, we first consider large national initiatives, and then turn to 
state and local initiatives of more modest scope.    
 
   
4.1 National Initiatives 
In hard-intervention national approaches (using the language of Cava-Ferreruela 
and Alabau-Muñoz (2006)), government intervenes forcefully in both the supply 
and the demand side of the market.  Given the demand-side focus of this paper, 
we look only at the latter aspect of these national plans, and use Korea as an ex-
ample.26
Merely having an interventionist government policy does not guarantee 
broadband success.  Aizu (2002) refers to Singapore as an example of interven-
tion without much result (at least by the time of his writing).  South Korea, on the 
other hand, makes nearly every commentator’s list of a successful national plan.  
Lee, O’Keefe, and Yun (2003) and Choudrie and Lee (2004) cite demand-side 
policy as an important factor in Korea’s broadband success, and in particular the 
Ten Million People Internet Education project.  The policy focused on educating 
homemakers (primarily married women not in the labor force) about the advan-
tages of computer usage and broadband, under the theory that as the principal de-
cision maker regarding household finances, the path to broadband adoption in the 
home led through the wife.  The government provided subsidies for private educa-
tional centers to train such homemakers in the use of the Internet.  Over one mil-
lion women received the training. 
As evidence of the success of this policy, Lee, O’Keefe, and Yun (2003) 
point to data showing that a greater proportion of “housewives”27 use the Internet 
in Korea than in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, or Taiwan.  However, without 
establishing how many such women would have used the Internet in the absence 
of the training, the difference among the countries cannot automatically be as-
cribed to the Korean policy.  There may be other cultural and economic differ-
ences between Asian countries that might also generate these differences in the 
data.  More informative may be data showing that the gender composition of 
Internet users shifted substantially toward equality over the years 1999-2002, 
                                                 
26 Some empirical studies examine the determinants of national penetration rates using cross-
country comparisons and data (e.g., Wallsten, 2006; Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Muñoz, 2006).  
A recent study by Belloc, Nicita, and Rossi (2009) specifically examines the impact of demand-
side policies in a country on its broadband penetration rate.  The authors conclude that demand-
side policies appear to be more effective than supply-side policies at encouraging broadband diffu-
sion.   The cross-country studies uniformly suffer from a relatively small sample size compared to 
the number of causal factors the researchers wish to explore.   
27 This term is used in the official English version of the report (KANIC, 2002). 
 
   
from 33 percent female in 1999 to 45 percent female in 2002.28  Similarly, from 
2001 to 2002, Internet usage by housewives increased from 27 percent to 37 per-
cent.  Even these figures do not prove the success of the program, however, for in 
the absence of national programs specifically aimed at closing demand-side 
broadband usage gaps (as in the US), lagging groups often tend to catch up over 
time (Hu and Prieger, 2009).  Much stronger evidence would come from compar-
ing gains in usage for women over time in Korea with gains for women in other 
countries without targeted training programs.  Ono (2006) analyzes digital ine-
quality in three Asian countries.  He finds that while using the Internet at home 
(conditional on having a computer) rose significantly for women in Korea be-
tween 1997 and 2000, it did not in Japan or Singapore.  Thus, while the available 
analyses cannot speak to how many women in Korea adopted broadband because 
of the training program, the weight of the evidence points at causality to some de-
gree. 
 The E-Rate program is one of the few national initiatives in the US (before 
the National Broadband Plan) designed to increase broadband adoption. The E-
Rate program is a federal subsidy program overseen by the FCC and administered 
by the non-governmental Universal Service Administration Company (USAC).29  
The E-Rate program is the largest explicit subsidy program to date intended to 
further broadband access in the US, with $2.25 billion authorized each year since 
1998 for schools and libraries.  The greatest share of the funding (upward of 85 
percent), and most of the effort expended evaluating the program, has gone to-
ward schools (Hudson, 2008).  The program offers discounts to schools of 20 to 
90 percent on telecommunications services, depending on what fraction of their 
students qualify for the federal means-tested free lunch program.   
A study of the first two years of the E-Rate program (Puma et al., 2002) 
highlights the difficulty of analyzing a policy when data on the pre-intervention 
state of affairs are not available.  In particular, any study of the E-Rate program 
necessarily suffers from lack of comprehensive data on schools’ access to digital 
technology before the E-Rate was offered.  The study used a national survey sam-
ple of school information.  The main finding of the study is statistically significant 
                                                 
28 The figure for 1999 is from a survey conducted under the auspices of the Korea Network 
Information Center (KANIC).  We could not find a copy of the survey results in English, but they 
are cited second hand on the World Bank web page “Indicators for Monitoring Gender and ICT” 
available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTGENDER/ 
EXTICTTOOLKIT/0,,contentMDK:20272986~menuPK:562601~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168
309~theSitePK:542820,00.html#_ftnref3.  The figure for 2002 is from KANIC (2002). 
29 See Hudson (2004, 2008) and Jayakar (2004) for background material on the E-Rate pro-
gram. 
 
   
evidence that availability of digital technology, including the fraction of schools 
and classrooms connected to the Internet, the speed of their Internet connections, 
and the number of Internet connections per student, increased in schools sup-
ported by the subsidies.  When it comes to investigating whether the subsidies ac-
tually caused the improvements, however, the study finds that the level of dis-
count the school received did not matter.30  The authors note that they cannot use 
control group methods, because almost all eligible schools in their survey took the 
E-Rate funds.  They nevertheless conclude with a favorable review of the E-Rate. 
Goolsbee and Guryan (2006) provide much more convincing evidence on 
the impact of the E-Rate program on schools, albeit only in California.  The study 
uses detailed data on public schools, including students’ achievement test scores, 
and their communities in California, as well as data from USAC on all E-Rate 
subsidy applications.  The authors note several problems they face in determining 
the causal impact of the program on outcomes.  Given that similar difficulties af-
flict most other studies of broadband-related programs, we discuss them in detail. 
First, Internet access in public schools was trending upward across the nation, and 
so an increase in access when the funding begins proves nothing by itself.  To get 
around this problem, they use variation in the level of the subsidy for which the 
school qualifies as a natural experiment in the data.  Thus, (loosely speaking) 
schools qualifying for lower subsidies serve as a control group for schools receiv-
ing higher subsidies.   
The second problem is the non-random nature of this “experiment:”  
schools received discount levels based on the poverty level of their students, 
which may be correlated with unobserved factors determining the level of tech-
nology in the classroom.  To address this issue, they use a regression discontinuity 
design, in which they exploit the fact that the E-Rate discounts are not a continu-
ous sliding scale but instead take discrete jumps at certain poverty thresholds.  So, 
for example, a school with 49 percent of its students on the free-lunch program 
qualifies for a 60 percent subsidy rate, while an otherwise similar school with 50 
percent of its students on the free-lunch program qualifies for an 80 percent sub-
sidy.  The regression discontinuity method compares outcomes in otherwise simi-
lar schools falling within near distance to one of the subsidy thresholds.  The au-
thors control for the non-random assignment of subsidies in a standard regression 
                                                 
30 See Appendix F of Puma, et al. (2002).  Note that due to the difficulties in determining the 
causal impact of the discounts on improvements in Internet usage (as we discuss below when re-
viewing the study of Goolsbee and Guryan (2006)) failure of this variable to have a net observed 
influence in a basic regression may not be too meaningful. 
 
   
framework, taking changes over time in Internet connections per classroom as the 
dependent variable to remove the influence of school-specific fixed effects. 
The results of the study provide convincing evidence that the subsidies did 
lead schools to spend more on telecommunications technology.  The price elastic-
ity of demand, where quantity is measured in units of Internet-connected class-
rooms, is estimated to be between -0.4 and -1.1.31  Furthermore, the study found 
that urban schools with large black and Hispanic populations had the greatest sen-
sitivity to price reductions.  Without the E-Rate program, the predicted classroom 
Internet connection rate is 40 percent, whereas with the program the connection 
rate is 66 percent, the difference between which they attribute to the impact of the 
program.  
In the final part of their study, Goolsbee and Guryan (2006) turn to the 
impact of the program on its ultimate goal of advancing the educational mission 
of the schools.  Here the answer is not as positive.  An analysis of achievement 
test scores in math, reading, and science shows no evidence that the investment in 
broadband connectivity had any effect on outcomes.  Similarly, there was meas-
urable effect on the probability of taking advanced classes in high school, the rate 
of graduates going into the state’s top-tier university system, or dropout rates.32   
An initial screen when assessing the effectiveness of any program is 
whether the money was spent on its intended purpose.  By any measure, fraud has 
been a problem with the E-Rate program (Jayakar, 2004).  The FCC found $17.3 
million in the USAC accounts that is potentially recoverable due to waste, fraud, 
and abuse of the E-Rate program for school and libraries, and states that “the E-
Rate program has been a prime target for fraud perpetrators” (OIG, 2009, p.37).  
It is possible that if wasted funds were removed from the analyses of Puma, et al. 
(2002) and Goolsbee and Guryan (2006), these analyses might have estimated 
stronger impacts from E-Rate programs.  
4.2 State Initiatives 
There are many initiatives by the states to spread the usage of broadband, al-
though many of the programs have not yet been thoroughly evaluated.  The E-NC 
Authority, a program dedicated to expanding broadband coverage and Internet 
                                                 
31 The regression-discontinuity approach returned even larger estimated impacts on technol-
ogy adoption in the classroom, but also had larger standard errors (Goolsbee and Guryan, 2006). 
32 Ward (2005) also found that the E-Rate program failed to improve education outcomes in 
schools.   
 
   
usage in North Carolina, is a state-level program that traces its roots to the state’s 
Rural Internet Access Authority created in 2000.33  The E-NC Authority focuses 
on rural and economically distressed urban areas.  Funding comes from a variety 
of public and private sources.  The program has undertaken various activities over 
the years, including offering reduced-cost computers to households.  It currently 
offers grants for deploying last-mile broadband connections and connecting 
schools to the Internet and funds seven Business & Technology Telecenters (a 
form of CTC) in rural areas.   
In a study funded by E-NC, (Wilson, 2008) chronicles the “amazing trans-
formation” in North Carolina over the years 1999-2008 in areas such as computer 
ownership, Internet access, and Internet usage.  For example, in 1999, only 57 
percent of rural households with home computers had Internet access, while by 
2004, this figure rose to about 90 percent, where it stayed for the next four 
years.34  However, the report only looks at changes over time within the state, and 
there is no control group or other methodology employed that would allow causal 
analysis these E-NC programs.35   
 Another major initiative, Connected Nation, partners with a growing num-
ber of states to map broadband infrastructure and to stimulate demand for broad-
band.  Connected Nation’s goal is to promote broadband availability and to in-
crease its use by facilitating public-private partnerships.36  There are no formal, 
external analyses of Connected Nation programs to date, and so we examine its 
own broad claims of its success in Kentucky (ConnectKentucky) and Tennessee 
(Connected Tennessee). 
ConnectKentucky is involved in many facets of digital inclusion, from 
providing computers to low-income families with children to broadband mapping 
with the goal of identifying opportunities for entry and areas where deployment 
should be encouraged.  During the time of the ConnectKentucky program, broad-
band availability in the state increased by 53 percent from 2005 to 2007 and 
                                                 
33 See http://www.e-nc.org.  
34 See Brodsky (2009) for a challenge of these figures.  
35 The report (when referring to gains in the fraction of rural households that use the Internet 
from home) states that “The e-NC Authority…should be proud that their work promoting com-
puter access and Internet literacy has paid off in this unusually strong growth in rural counties.”  
Unfortunately, this report appears not to provide the quantitative analyses necessary to permit this 
causal conclusion to be drawn. 
36 Connected Nation has programs in Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia.  Some of these currently focus nearly ex-
clusively on broadband mapping.  See http://connectednation.org/who_we_are/.  
 
   
broadband use at home rose by 73 percent, the latter increase (from 22 percent in 
2004 to 38 percent in early 2007) claimed to be more in percentage terms than 
any other state during the period (Mefford, 2007).37  Computer ownership by 
households also increased by 20 percent (five times the national average).  These 
statistics have been offered before Congress as evidence of the success of Con-
nectKentucky (Mefford, 2007), and the program takes credit for all these ad-
vances.38  
Such a concerted effort on deploying and promoting the use of broadband 
no doubt had an impact in Kentucky.  However, at least some of the growth in 
availability and usage would have occurred anyway.  To mention just one other 
factor, Kentucky was also a top-ten recipient (in per capita terms) of federal E-
Rate funding over the years 1998-2006 (Hudson, 2008), and the resulting in-
creased availability of and exposure to the Internet surely prompted some of the 
growth in Internet use at home.  With no control group provided within or without 
the state, there is no way to know how much of the growth in broadband adoption 
would have occurred in the absence of ConnectKentucky.   
Furthermore, the particular statistics cited may be misleading to the un-
wary, because percentage increases in percentages can be difficult to interpret.  
When adoption rates are low, as they were in Kentucky in 2004, even modest 
numbers of new subscribers look large in percentage terms.  Compare Kentucky’s 
increase in broadband adoption rates with those from a wealthier and less rural 
state, Connecticut.  For comparability we use statistics from the FCC and calcu-
late the ratio of residential broadband lines to households.39  By this measure, 
Kentucky increased from a penetration rate of 20 percent in 2005 to 43 percent in 
2007, compared with an increase in Connecticut from 49 to 74 percent over the 
same years.  Note that while the percentage increase in the penetration rate is 
higher in Kentucky, the increase in the level of the percentage points is about the 
                                                 
37 Given that there are no yearly official statistics in the US on household broadband adoption 
rates, and that the FCC statistics on broadband lines for 2004 do not differentiate between residen-
tial and small business customers, it is unclear which statistics Connected Nation used for rates in 
other states. 
38 See http://www.connectkentucky.org/what_we_do/prescription_for_innovation.php.  
39 The former statistics are taken from the FCC’s High-Speed Services for Internet Access 
semi-annual status reports (for mid-year figures), available at 
http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/iatd/comp.html, while the estimates of households in the states are from 
the US Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) program (three-year estimates for 
2005-2007).  Census states that ACS three-year estimates represent the average characteristics 
over the period, and so we took the household figures to be for 2006.  We then adjusted the house-
hold figures for other years by assuming that growth rates in the number of households mirrored 
that of population in each state. 
 
   
same but a bit greater in Connecticut (where there was no Connected Nation or 
other demand-stimulus program).40  This critique is not meant to imply that Con-
nectKentucky’s programs were ineffective.  Our point is merely that when pene-
tration rates are low to begin with and broadband usage is generally increasing, it 
is likely that growth rates in adoption will be high regardless of targeted pro-
grams.41
Perhaps a better comparison state is Tennessee, which is more similar to 
Kentucky in terms of per-capita income but did not have a Connected Nation pro-
gram in place during the 2005-2007 period.42  Using comparable data as above, 
we find that Tennessee increased from a penetration rate of 26 percent in 2005 to 
47 percent in 2007.  Thus, whether looking at Kentucky, Connecticut, or Tennes-
see, broadband penetration appears to have increased by about the same number 
of percentage points (21 to 25).43  Besides growth in broadband adoption rates, 
ConnectKentucky also includes among its metrics of success that home computer 
ownership grew by 20 percent in the state (ConnectKentucky, 2007).  Computer 
ownership was 58 percent in 2003, 65 percent in 2005 and 72 percent by the sec-
ond half of 2007.44  These rates imply that about 135,000 households gained 
computers.  Given that ConnectKentucky reports that its No Child Left Offline 
program distributed fewer than 2,000 computers to homes, it can be directly re-
sponsible for only a small portion of this growth (less than 1.5 percent of the 
                                                 
40 The penetration rates in Kentucky increased by 23 percentage points and by 115 percent.  
The penetration rates in Connecticut increased by 25 percentage points and by 51 percent. 
41 There is a further technical reason why econometric studies usually choose to examine 
changes in rates rather than percentage changes in rates.  When the rates pertain to units of obser-
vation (states, in this case) that have unobserved, time-invariant factors that may contaminate the 
analysis, taking the difference in rates over time (known as differencing the data, or more gener-
ally as using a fixed effects model) removes the influence of those factors and allows regression to 
isolate the causal impact of a policy.  Taking percentage changes in the rates requires dividing the 
change in rates by the earlier rate, which re-introduces the very factors the change eliminated.  To 
be precise, when the true model for a rate y for unit i at time t is yit = αi + β xit + εit, where αi is 
the influence of the contaminating factors and is correlated with the error term εit, then differenc-
ing the data produces the valid regression model Δyit = β Δxit + uit to consistently estimate the 
desired causal effect β of policy variable xit.  If instead the dependent variable is taken to be the 
percentage change in rate y, Δyit/yit-1 , then αi creeps back into the regression equation. 
42 The first action by Connected Tennessee, a release of broadband infrastructure maps for the 
state, was in the second half of 2007. 
43 Note that it is also possible that without intervention from ConnectKentucky’s programs, 
performance in Kentucky may have lagged growth in other states.  Thus, simply keeping pace 
with penetration growth in other states does not demonstrate ineffectiveness. 
44 The earliest statistic is from the US Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey, October 
2003 (see http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/computer/2003/tab01B.xls), and the latter 
two statistics are from ConnectKentucky (2007). 
 
   
growth, to be precise).  Of course, it is possible that ConnectKentucky is indi-
rectly responsible for more of the growth through its other programs. 
ConnectKentucky employs basic control-group methodology in one of its 
publications (ConnectKentucky, 2008).  Comparing counties that received com-
puters through No Child Left Offline with other counties, ConnectKentucky 
(2008) reports that:  computer ownership among low-income families in program 
counties grew nearly four times faster than low-income families in other counties;  
Internet adoption among low-income families in program counties grew more 
than ten times faster relative to low-income families in other areas; and broadband 
adoption among low-income families grew five times faster in program counties 
than in other counties.45
However, the comparison does not assure that the findings represent caus-
al impacts for two reasons.  First, the ConnectKentucky program (by design) 
chose the poorest, most underperforming counties in which to operate, and prop-
erly so, given its goals of extending digital inclusion.  Thus, there is no notion of 
random assignment or a controlled experiment.  Second, the comparisons are 
again given in terms of growth rates, which (as we have argued above) are always 
likely to be higher when starting from a lower baseline.  It is thus impossible to 
know what the true impact of ConnectKentucky has been based solely on these 
reported figures. 
4.3 Local Private Initiatives 
There are dozens, if not hundreds, of local programs in the US with comprehen-
sive goals that include spurring broadband adoption.  We choose a few that have 
been subject to some degree of evaluation, and first discuss ZeroDivide, a philan-
thropic organization that seeks to increase digital inclusion in low-income and 
underserved areas of California with the goal of economic development.  ZeroDi-
vide recently funded five wireless broadband access projects in low-income, 
mostly non-white communities (Lee, 2009).46  The projects were part of larger 
digital inclusion efforts in each community that sought to increase digital literacy, 
train community members in the use of technology, further household computer 
ownership by providing free or low-cost equipment, and develop community-
                                                 
45 Whether this last comparison is to low-income families in other counties or to overall rates 
in other counties is unclear. 
46 The communities were in Los Angeles, San Jose, San Diego, Sacramento, and San Fran-
cisco. 
 
   
based web content.  In addition to deploying Wi-Fi broadband networks, each 
project included a community technology center for training and computer access.   
The projects provided broadband access to 451 homes, computers to 211 
households, and training to 335 individuals.  The total cost to ZeroDivide was 
$250,000, and the entire cost of the projects (including funding by partners) was 
more than twice that amount.47  Unlike most project evaluations, Lee (2009) was 
able to measure Internet usage on the project’s equipment, both by average daily 
number of users and amount of data downloaded.  Less quantifiable were the 
claims that the projects increased educational attainment, promoted economic de-
velopment, furthered the delivery of Government and Social Services, built com-
munity assets, empowered communities, and spurred civic action.  
 Our second local initiative is the Digital Inclusion Project (DIP). DIP is 
run by the Digital Inclusion Group (DIG), formerly Wireless Philadelphia.  DIG 
partners with community organizations that distribute to low-income clients a 
“TechPak” that includes an ultra-portable laptop computer, high-speed Internet 
service, digital literacy training, local technical support, and content aimed at low-
income households.  The free computer is an important part of the project,48 but 
each partnering community organization tied the computer into a larger program 
such as vocational training or parenting classes.  While the partnership model al-
lowed DIG to extend its reach into more communities than it had the resources to 
do on its own, the model also ran into difficulties due to the uneven technological 
capabilities of the partners, some of whom needed more digital training them-
selves (OMG, 2008).  The partnership collectively distributed 762 digital bundles 
by the time of the review, reaching 77 percent of their distribution goals. 
The preliminary evaluation of the DIP by OMG (2008) was conducted af-
ter only three months of its operation, and so few metrics regarding its success 
were available.  Some difficulties were noted.  Due to technical problems with the 
Wi-Fi network Earth Link set up, many clients did not receive strong or consistent 
signals in their homes, which negated some of the value of the free hardware and 
                                                 
47 The sum of the stated funds contributed by all partners listed in Lee (2009) is $542,900, but 
many contributions and much of the labor cost do not have dollar values assigned.  Thus, the 
available figures only imply that the cost per household impacted was at least $1,200, but it is im-
possible to know how much more the cost may have been. 
48 The justification given in the evaluation for the importance of the free computer is pre-
sumably true, but weakly documented.  The report states that “interviewees all agree that there is a 
large demand for free, low-cost, and/or discounted hardware among underserved populations” and 
that even among residents with income above the threshold, “there is client demand for new com-
puters at discounted rates” (OMG, 2008, p.5).  
 
   
software.  The need for strong technical support to offer to clients also became 
apparent, particularly after Earth Link pulled out of the partnership in 2008.  The 
evaluation also finds that the number of TechPaks distributed was not the best 
predictor of overall Internet use by DIP clients.  More important factors were 
whether the free computer was integrated into the training sessions with the cli-
ents, whether the free bundle was used to incentivize the training, and whether the 
partnering organizations followed up with the clients.  Client use of the technol-
ogy was surveyed, but no specific metrics of enhanced digital inclusion are em-
ployed in the preliminary evaluation and no control group was included in the 
analysis. 
 Lastly, we discuss One Economy’s Digital Communities programs for 
low-income communities. One Economy is funded by a private foundation to 
provide families with low-cost computers and free Internet access (some wireless, 
some fixed access, and not all broadband) in the home (Michalchik, et al., 2006).  
In addition to the equipment and service, One Economy also trains youth as 
“Digital Connectors” to help set-up and troubleshoot the computers on an on-
going basis.  An important part of the Digital Community concept is the Beehive, 
an online portal to information about finances, health, school, jobs, childcare, and 
other topics of local interest to the community.  Thus, while the subsidized com-
puter is the “foundation” of the efforts (Michalchik, et al., 2006), the program 
also seeks to lower barriers related to the price of Internet access, lack of relevant 
content online, and lack of digital literacy and computer skills. 
Michalchik, et al. (2006) evaluate two Digital Communities set up by One 
Economy (one in San Jose, California and another in the Little Havana neighbor-
hood of Miami, Florida).  The research group surveyed participants in the pro-
gram soon after joining and again after about a year, and also conducted focus 
groups.  There was no explicit control group for the studied communities, but 
comparisons were made to low-income usage across the nation, as determined 
from the Pew Internet surveys.49  The main finding of the study is that the pro-
gram led to large increases in Internet usage at home for participants.  After a year 
in the program, 82 to 86 percent of participants reported using the Internet at 
home, compared to only 46 percent of low-income households nationally.  Of 
more importance for present purposes, 63 percent of the participants in San Jose 
had broadband access at home, 29 percent of those in Miami had broadband, but 
                                                 
49 With program participation in each location limited to 100 participants, there likely was ex-
cess demand for inclusion in the project.  A useful control group might have been drawn from 
applicants who were not given computers and Internet access, since they were presumably of simi-
lar motivation to get connected (an important unobserved factor determining Internet adoption) 
and of similar demographic characteristics to those families that were accepted. 
 
   
only 17 percent of the national low-income sample did.  The evaluation does not 
report increases in Internet or broadband use at home, but (given the nature of the 
program) it is reasonable to assume that usage rates were near zero among par-
ticipants before they joined the program.  Another encouraging result is that of the 
92 percent in each city that had Internet connectivity at home one and a half years 
after the program started, only about one third were still using free wireless access 
provided by One Economy.  Thus, many households apparently had become pay-
ing Internet subscribers.50
4.4 Local Municipal Initiatives 
One of the few subsidy policies with independent, peer-reviewed external evalua-
tion is the LaGrange Internet TV (LITV) program in Georgia (Youtie, Shapira, 
and Laudeman, 2007).  The municipal LITV program gave residents a free pack-
age consisting of a wireless keyboard and an intelligent TV set-top box, which 
(using the cable TV network) allowed users to use e-mail and browse the Internet.  
The setup enabled Internet access,51 but of an inferior quality, since the only 
monitor was the television, the terminal had no storage capacity, and users could 
not download files, open attachments, run browser plug-ins, or print.  On the plus 
side, the system was simpler to use than a full computer setup, and for no addi-
tional cost beyond the $8 subscription fee for basic cable, a household in La-
Grange (a small town of about 30,000 residents) could access the Internet. 
Despite the marginal price of zero for the package, a full 40 percent of eli-
gible households never tried LITV at all.  Only half of these households had an-
other form of Internet connection.  Non-adopting households came from across 
the income and education spectrum.  Thus, a free, easy-to-use system did not 
automatically attract all low-income, less-educated households.  Youtie, Shapira, 
and Laudeman (2007) conclude from their basic quantitative analysis that lower-
ing the price alone, in the absence of other initiatives to stimulate demand such as 
education and training, is insufficient to accomplish policy goals such as increas-
ing residents’ ICT-related skills.  The authors of the study are not able to isolate 
the relative importance of adoption drivers such as the low-quality experience and 
the technical problems that plagued the project.  However, the message from the 
experience underscores an important lesson for policymakers:  subsidies alone 
may not be enough to reach all targeted households. 
                                                 
50 It is unclear from the evaluation exactly how many households migrated to fully paid sub-
scriptions, since not all were initially receiving access through the One Economy wireless access 
points. 
51 Technically, the service was not broadband, but it was twice as fast as dial-up. 
 
   
4.5 Programs Not Primarily Targeting Broadband Adop-
tion 
Federal, state, and local governments have proposed or implemented a variety of 
programs tangentially related to promoting broadband demand.  Two such types 
of programs are those that provide computers directly to households, and those 
that provide computers to publicly accessible sites.  Studies assert that programs 
that give computers to households succeed in so increasing computer usage (An-
drews, Jannasch-Pennell, and DiGangi, 2004).   
One example of such a program is the Computers for Youth project.  
Computers for Youth partners with schools in low-income areas, giving children 
refurbished desktop computers, educational and general software, reduced price 
Internet access,52 training, and technical support.53  The first-year outcomes of the 
program, focusing on how computer use at home affects engagement and per-
formance in school, are evaluated in Tsikalas, Lee, and Newkirk (2007).  Stu-
dents’ home computer and Internet use explained 14 percent of the variance in 
standardized test scores in math, beyond the (larger) amount of variance explained 
by the previous year’s score.  An interesting finding from the Computers for 
Youth program is that even with the free computer and Internet access, thirty per-
cent of the children reported that they never accessed the Internet from home 
(Tsikalas, Lee, and Newkirk, 2007).  Whether this is due to lack of Internet-
specific training or lack of motivation or interest is not investigated.  Neverthe-
less, the program demonstrates once again that merely pulling down the barriers 
associated with cost and computer access does not necessarily, by itself, lead to 
full digital inclusion.   
Community access to computers is often accomplished through CTCs.  
Pollio and Truscott (2004) examine the Grace Hill Settlement House, which oper-
ates a CTC funded under NTIA’s Technology Opportunities Program.  The CTC 
provided computer and Internet training classes for the parents of children in 
Grace Hill’s Head Start program, with the goal of “e-involvement.”  Pollio and 
Truscott (2004) found that English-speaking children showed developmental im-
provement in the Head Start program when their parents received the training.  In 
addition, Internet usage by participants increased by 59 points.54  
                                                 
52 Students were given eight hours of Internet access free, and then charged $10/month. 
53 A description of the program is available at http://www.cfy.org/take-it-home.php.  
54 Given that only three months passed between the surveys, it is probably safe to presume 
that nonparticipants in the control group would not have increased their digital literacy much, and 
so the lack of a control group in this instance may not be of much import.  Of greater importance, 
 
   
For an excellent and comprehensive review covering many hundreds of 
other digital literacy programs, see Hilding-Hamann, et al. (2009a, b), who iden-
tify best practices and common themes among the various digital inclusion initia-
tives.  The authors also review the empirical findings on outcomes of a panoply of 
projects across OECD countries, and conclude there is a paucity of convincing 
demonstrations of outcomes and impacts.   
5 Synthesis and Conclusion 
5.1 What Works Best 
While our review of program evaluations revealed a disappointing dearth of stud-
ies that quantify the causal impact of programs in a convincing manner, a few 
general conclusions on what makes a program successful can be drawn from the 
literature.  Given the multiplicity of barriers to broadband adoption, a successful 
program must tackle many goals.  A program should motivate non-users to adopt, 
make broadband affordable, employ content in the training that relates to every-
day life or the use of public services, and focus on the accessibility and usability 
of broadband and online services (EC DGISM, 2008).  In other words, encourag-
ing broadband adoption is only part of a larger digital literacy effort, and pro-
grams work when they make non-users want to connect, make the Internet 
cheaper and easier to use, and adjust to users’ preferences. 
The scope of programs ranges from national initiatives down to grassroots 
efforts in local communities.  There are advantages and disadvantages to each end 
of the spectrum.  One of the difficulties with large federal programs concerns 
oversight.  Programs can be cost-effective only if they are effectively overseen 
and if those receiving the funding are held accountable for its disposition.  When 
the sums of money are large and the provider of funding is far removed from the 
local projects that are the ultimate recipients, the incentive for waste and abuse of 
funds is heightened.55   
Local efforts have many commendable advantages.  When local govern-
ments or community organizations are involved in overcoming broadband adop-
tion gaps, they typically begin with a more complete knowledge of what the barri-
                                                                                                                                     
we suspect, is that participants were self-selected: the treatment group consists of parents moti-
vated enough to agree to be in the program. 
55 Of course, the avoidance of illegal use of the taxpayers’ money is only a necessary condi-
tion for the economic efficiency.  Full efficiency requires accomplishing a program’s goals at min-
imum cost and directing funding to programs where the next dollar will have the highest demon-
strable impact. 
 
   
ers are in the community. National policies may tend toward one-size-fits-all solu-
tions handed down from above.  For example, if the E-Rate program’s provision 
of access had been coupled with programs to increase the digital skills of the 
teachers themselves, and to train them in the pedagogical uses of the Internet, 
perhaps outcomes would have been better.  While not qualifying as waste in the 
legal sense, it is surely economically inefficient to install telecommunications 
equipment in a school where teachers do not know how to integrate it into their 
teaching.   
Local organizations also may be more effective at ensuring that programs 
are actually utilized by the intended recipients.  One of the difficulties encoun-
tered by the California Teleconnect Fund, a government-run subsidy program for 
schools, libraries, and hospitals administered at the state level, is that many tar-
geted institutions had never even heard of the program after it had been operating 
for almost a decade (CPUC, 2005).  Contrast this with the Digital Inclusion Pro-
ject’s approach to reaching the disconnected by partnering with grassroots organi-
zations that were already involved with the targeted communities in Philadelphia 
(OMG, 2008). 
The disadvantages of purely local efforts have to do with the limited capa-
bilities of such organizations to collect data and set up programs in such a way 
that they can be evaluated effectively.  This may be where direction and resources 
from the larger funding source (national or state-level, for example) can provide 
valuable guidance and assistance.  For instance, part of the funding can be pro-
vided for the local organization to partner with a university or other external, in-
dependent policy research group to assist in designing policies with quantitative 
program evaluation in mind, and to perform the actual analysis.   
5.2 What is Missing in the Literature 
5.2.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
One of the most glaring omissions from most program evaluations we reviewed 
was any rigorous attempt to assess how the costs of the project or initiative com-
pared to the benefits.  Benefits may be difficult to quantify, but no better alterna-
tive to CBA has been proposed to efficiently allocate society’s resources to meet 
the many policy goals we have in the US today.  Even setting aside the benefits, 
the cost-side analysis of most project evaluations we reviewed is largely deficient.  
Many evaluations look only at outcomes without considering whether (or assum-
ing that) the benefits justify the costs (which remain uncounted).   
 
   
Even when evaluators attempt to examine the cost side of a program, they 
often disregard elements of social cost not directly funded by “their” organization.  
In other words, many program evaluations take a narrow rather than a social view 
of costs.56  A common unaccounted cost of a project is the opportunity cost of 
paid or volunteer labor.  For example, the Digital Impact Group does not include 
overhead or staffing cost in its estimates of the cost of their “TechPak” (OMG, 
2009).  Some evaluations explicitly claimed that CBA was impossible due to the 
involvement of volunteers.  For example, Lee (2009) notes that many committed 
staff members of projects funded by ZeroDivide were motivated to provide un-
paid hours of labor to help the projects succeed, and so the true social cost of the 
program is greater than its accounting costs. 
Similar undercounting of labor appears in official federal project evalua-
tions.  For example, consider an evaluation sponsored by the National Telecom-
munications and Information Agency (NTIA) of a NETmobile project funded 
through its Telecommunications and Information Infrastructure Assistance Pro-
gram.  The project had about $345,000 in itemized project costs (federal and oth-
er), but substantial amounts of time donated by private sector employees to the 
project are not valued in the report because the hours were not charged to the 
grant (NTIA, 1998).57
There is also much room for improvement in the majority of evaluations 
that do not attempt to quantify any benefits.  Statements that advantages and bene-
fits of a program are “invaluable,” “profound,” or “priceless”—all of which we 
ran across in our review of program evaluations—are of little use in guiding pol-
icy makers toward sound decisions. 
While appropriate CBA is essential for program evaluation, it is beyond 
the scope of this review to begin CBA of specific programs that may be imple-
mented under the National Broadband Plan. It would be instructive to draw les-
sons from careful and thorough CBA of other governmental programs aimed at 
                                                 
56 The counterpart to the narrow view on the benefit side are the evaluations we reviewed that 
justify a state or local project’s success by the amount of federal grant money it receives, ignoring 
that from the social point of view, such transfers are socially neutral at best and deadweight-loss 
creating at worst (due to inefficient funding mechanisms). 
57 The project evaluation states that 4,234 individuals were “served” by the NETmobile (a 
mobile computer, Internet access, and teaching lab).  At the stated project cost, the average cost 
per individual is only about $80, which sounds very cost-effective until (reading on in the report) 
it appears that some of those “served” were schoolchildren who spent only 25 minutes in the 
NETmobile.  The report also notes that the NETmobile had its hubcaps stolen in Washington, 
D.C. (it is unclear whether the replacement cost of the hubcaps was included in the project cost). 
 
   
technology diffusion. However, per Stoneman and Diederen (1994), as late as the 
1990’s there were no evaluations of whether actual technology diffusion policies 
pass economic CBA tests, and we are unaware of complete analyses of programs 
aimed at encouraging the diffusion of consumer technologies since that time. 
Nevertheless, the theoretical literature on technology diffusion policy suggests 
when a program might have the greatest net social benefits (in addition to the fac-
tors for program success discussed above). Work by Stoneman and David (1986) 
suggests that subsidies for the use of technology may be more beneficial socially 
when the good is supplied by imperfectly competitive markets, for then it is less 
likely that the effective price to the consumer is driven below the marginal cost of 
provision. On the other hand, when policy takes the form of providing informa-
tion about the technology (which, in the current context, also would include train-
ing in the use of the broadband), intervention may best be directed toward com-
petitive markets. In such markets, where free-riding concerns make the private 
provision of information less profitable, government efforts are less likely to 
crowd out private efforts (Stoneman and David, 1986). This suggests, very 
broadly, that policies targeting the price of broadband may be best deployed in 
geographic regions where competition in the provision of broadband is less ro-
bust, and using other demand stimulus methods in markets where competition is 
stronger. 
5.2.2 Rigorous Program Evaluation 
Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), in the context of evaluating job training 
programs, stress the importance of focusing on program outcomes rather than 
program completion, collecting data that will enable an evaluation, and using the 
appropriate economic model.58  These three elements are required to conduct an 
evaluation of a program that is useful to policymakers and others concerned about 
the efficient allocation of resources to meet social goals.  We touch on each ele-
ment in turn. 
Confusing the execution of a program with the attainment of its ultimate 
goals is an easy pitfall for evaluators to fall into, and formal program reviews too 
often limit their analysis to proximate goals.  As one review noted, “…many grant 
recipients tended to focus on whether an initiative had been successfully executed, 
as opposed to whether the initiative had helped to address a broader community 
                                                 
58 The work cited by Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999) includes many serious and credi-
ble attempts to evaluate the benefits of job programs and on occasion to combine the results with 
CBA (although CBA does not appear fruitful for job training programs in general – see LaLonde 
(1995)).  
 
   
problem” (Frechtling, et al. 1999). The fact that it is easier to measure successful 
program execution partially explains the lack of focus on whether a program 
meets its larger goals.  However, another part of the explanation may be that it is 
much easier for a program to be correctly completed than it is for it to have real 
impacts on participants.  Therefore, for those wishing to demonstrate the “suc-
cess” of a program (particularly if further funding is contingent upon the analy-
sis), there may be little incentive to address the more difficult questions of ulti-
mate impacts.   
Without the right data, it can be impossible to evaluate whether an initia-
tive met its goals.  Unless the funding agency explicitly requires recipients of 
funds to collect appropriate data, it should not expect useful data to be gathered.59  
The effort to gather appropriate data must begin at the inception of the project, for 
it might determine who should be chosen to receive funding in the first place.  
Take the Digital Inclusion Project as an example:  OMG (2008, p. iii) reports that 
while the sponsors wanted to track client outcomes, project partners were neither 
selected for their abilities to do so nor were they so trained.  The recommenda-
tions for setting up the Digital Excellence project in Chicago (ACCDD, 2007) 
provide a good model.  The report encourages the project to partner with a univer-
sity to conduct baseline surveys in affected and unaffected neighborhoods.  Even 
when these tasks are outsourced, however, the partners must be brought into the 
project before the intervention begins, to be able to collect baseline data. 
The data gathering effort also must be integrated with the program partici-
pation guidelines.  For example, one factor limiting the analysis of the Digital In-
clusion Project is that the community partners did not develop agreements with 
clients to stay in contact for longitudinal data collection (OMG, 2008).  When 
various such community partners are involved, it becomes all the more important 
that the entity funding the projects establish a consistent set of metrics that recipi-
ent organizations must report.  Lee (2009) notes in her preliminary evaluation of 
five ZeroDivide digital inclusion projects in California that grantees were not re-
quired to report a standard set of data on activities and outcomes, so that system-
atic evaluation of labor costs, for example, was impossible.  Furthermore, Lee 
(2009) also found that data were missing on all basic aspects of the projects, in-
cluding network usage, training, demographics of the participants, adoption rates, 
job creation, which made assessing the projects difficult. 
                                                 
59 For example, Frechtling, et al. (1999, p.VI) note that “few of the 1994 and 1995 [TOP] pro-
jects…invested the staff or financial resources needed to collect…data that could be used to assess 
real progress toward their community change goals.” 
 
   
Finally, the best data in the world are of little use unless program evalua-
tors use appropriate methods of analysis.  Appropriate statistical methods must be 
used to assess whether the program resulted in its intended external results for its 
beneficiaries and the broader public.  It may be appropriate to draw lessons from 
the literature on empirical studies of job training programs and their effects on 
labor market outcomes, which are among the strongest examples of program 
evaluations that we have in economics (see, e.g., LaLonde (1995) and the many 
studies cited in Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999)).  A primary focus of this 
literature is on evaluating the appropriateness (and perils) of various methodolo-
gies used to measure program success (Heckman and Smith, 1998; Heckman, 
LaLonde, and Smith, 1999).  There is no one best econometric method that fits all 
cases, and often researchers use multiple methods to be able to draw robust con-
clusions.60  However, when a control or comparison group is available (as it will 
be if the program is designed well), the differences in differences (D-D) tech-
nique, a staple of the modern econometric approach to program evaluation, often 
works well.61 The best succinct recommendation for project overseers is to col-
laborate with an academic or other quantitative analysis group with experience in 
causal econometric policy evaluation.   
Sometimes the non-experimental nature of policies requires the use of 
more sophisticated econometric methods for analysis.  For example, Kandilov and 
Renkow (2009) use both differences-in-differences and propensity score tech-
niques62 to find that USDA broadband loans had no impact on economic devel-
opment. However, even the most basic use of econometrics would be a step for-
ward in most evaluations.  Far too many evaluations use “soft” analytical methods 
from the social sciences to come to “hard” causal conclusions.  Too often, case 
study evaluation methods consist of little more than reporting results of focus 
                                                 
60 For example, Goolsbee and Guryan (2006) employ both regression-discontinuity design 
and multiple regression techniques in their study of the E-Rate program.   
61 D-D removes the impact of all factors that are specific to the individual but do not change 
over time, and also the impact of all factors that are year specific but do not change across indi-
viduals in the sample (Meyer, 1995).  Thus, D-D can identify trends in broadband usage for pro-
gram participants that are net of trends affecting participants and non-participants alike.  Control-
ling for overall trends in broadband adopting is important, given that adoption is steadily rising in 
the US.   
62 Propensity scores have been used to reduce bias in studies where the individuals (or other 
units of observation) choosing to participate in a program differ from those who do not.  In studies 
such as these, the participants and the control group may differ markedly with respect to observed 
characteristics, and such differences can lead to biased estimates of a program’s effects. The pro-
pensity score is the conditional probability of participating given the individual’s characteristics, 
which is used to match individuals in the program participation group with those in the control 
group, thus matching like to like and reducing bias.  
 
   
group discussions.  While qualitative methodology may help the program fine-
tune its methods and approaches to achieving its goals, such analyses are nearly 
useless for answering questions about the cost effectiveness and ultimate benefits 
of the program.   
Regardless of how sophisticated is the econometric method, the core idea 
of establishing the causal impact of a program is to compare observed outcomes 
with an estimate of the counterfactual:  what outcomes would have been in the 
absence of the program.  Econometric techniques differ in the way they identify 
that causal impact, but the basic idea is the same in all methods.  In fact, good 
methods for policy analysis are all variations on the theme of drawing causal con-
clusions that are immune to the Fallacy of False Cause we noted in the introduc-
tion.  Note that there may be few internal incentives for a program to evaluate rig-
orously the causal effects of its policies.  Given that broadband adoption is gener-
ally increasing across all groups in the US,63 it is easy to “show” that a program 
“led to” more adoption by noting that adoption rose after a program was insti-
tuted.  Netting out what would have happened anyway, in the absence of the pro-
gram, only serves to diminish the apparent impact of the program.   
It is interesting to note that the FCC’s National Broadband Plan does not 
appear to be focused on ascertaining causal impacts in this way.  Although the 
Notice of Inquiry for the National Broadband Plan addressed this issue squarely 
by asking for comment “on how progress can be measured relative to progress 
that would have occurred in the absence of any program to better understand the 
impact of the program” (FCC, 2009, p. 11), the Plan itself contains no such rec-
ommendation.  In fact, the Plan appears to be predisposed toward confirming its 
own success, with statements such as “[i]f this broadband plan is effective, we 
will see rapid progress in terms of increased adoption….”  Given the progress of 
broadband adoption across every demographic group over the past decade (albeit 
at differing rates among groups), it is difficult to imagine circumstances under 
which continued progress would not occur even absent the Plan.64  
                                                 
63 Even in the recent tough economic times for many households, fewer than one in ten can-
celed or cut back their Internet service (Horrigan, 2009b).  In fact, the same survey shows that 
households cling to their online access more than they do to wired or wireless phone or cable tele-
vision services. 
64 The Plan also explicitly puts evaluation in the back seat of the policy car:  “evaluation is not 
an excuse for paralysis. Actions and their results matter most to capturing the opportunities broad-
band presents” (Ch. 17 of the Plan). 
 
   
6 Final Thoughts 
In our review of programs that seek to accomplish the goal of stimulating demand 
for broadband Internet access, we have focused narrowly on the question of “what 
works?”  We did not begin, as many such studies do, with the larger question of 
why broadband adoption should be stimulated, and we do not intend to take up 
the question here.  However, we note that careful, convincing quantitative studies 
on the benefits provided by broadband for individual users are just as rare—if not 
even scarcer—than those on program effectiveness.  To quote Strover (2009, 
p.213): “[T]here is scant evidence that telecommunications can transform lives in 
the absence of change in other structural features, such as household income and 
education levels.”   
The National Broadband Plan calls for the establishment of a “broadband 
data depository” to facilitate research on program effectiveness.65  While the de-
tails of the depository remain in the air, we may shortly be entering a new era of 
research possibilities regarding broadband usage and policy.  We hope that our 
review herein, highlighting how slim the literature actually is, serves as a call to 
arms to stimulate renewed effort and attention toward measuring and quantifying 
actual impacts of programs and of broadband itself on the American people. 
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